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ON SOME STANDARD OBJECTIONS TO 
MATHEMATICAL CONVENTIONALISM
Abstract. According to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, 
that is, conventions, or implications of conventions. So his position can be regarded as 
a form of conventionalism. However, mathematical conventionalism is widely thought 
to be untenable due to objections presented by Quine, Dummett and Crispin Wright. It 
has also been argued that only an implausibly radical form of conventionalism could 
withstand the critical implications of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. In 
this article I discuss those objections to conventionalism and argue that none of them is 
convincing.
According to Wittgenstein, mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, 
that is, it would appear, conventions (PG 190, AWL 156–7, BT 196, RFM 
199a), or at least determined by conventions (see Schroeder 2014). A 
mathematical proposition doesn’t describe a fact (RFM 356ef), but serves as a 
linguistic convention: ‘only supposed to supply a framework for a description’ 
(RFM 356f), determining the correct use of language (RFM 165h, 196f): what 
in a certain area of discourse makes sense and what doesn’t (RFM 164bc). So 
Wittgenstein’s position (which he held from the early 1930s to the end of his 
life) can be labelled as a form of conventionalism.
Perhaps the best-known presentation of conventionalism in the 
philosophy of mathematics is due to the Logical Positivists, in particular 
A.J. Ayer, who defended the view that all mathematical truths are analytic 
(1936). That is to say, they can be derived from a set of conventions defining 
the meanings of our mathematical symbols. For instance, the conventional 
definition of the series of natural numbers in terms of addition of 1 (each 
number > 1 being defined as its predecessor + 1) logically implies any correct 
equation of the form a + b = c. Thus, an equation such as ‘7 + 5 = 12’ can 
easily be proven by a succession of definitional substitutions. (In this, of 
course, Ayer contradicted Kant’s construal of such an equation as synthetic 
a priori.)
However, mathematical conventionalism has encountered some 
strong opposition. W.v.O. Quine and Michael Dummett objected that 
conventionalism is either circular or cannot account for the logical implications 
of conventions. Crispin Wright tried to show that conventionalism falls 
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foul of an infinite regress. It has also been argued that only an implausibly 
radical form of conventionalism could withstand the critical implications 
of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. I shall discuss those four 
objections to conventionalism in turn:
(i) Quine’s circularity objection;
(ii) Dummett’s objection that conventionalism cannot explain logical 
inferences;
(iii) Crispin Wright’s infinite regress objection;
(iv) The objection to ‘moderate conventionalism’ from scepticism about 
rule-following.
(i) Quine’s circularity objection
To begin with, I shall consider Quine’s critical discussion of conventionalism 
in his paper ‘Truth by Convention’ (1936).
Quine proposes to explain the truth of an analytic statement, such as:
(1) A bachelor is an unmarried man.
as follows: Since the word ‘bachelor’ is defined to mean ‘unmarried man’, (1) 
is equivalent to:
(2) An unmarried man is an unmarried man.
And that is a truth of logic (Quine 1936, 323).
However, that is not a very plausible account of analyticity, as it regards 
language from the artificial, not to say warped, perspective of formal logic. 
Logicians may see nothing unnatural in a formula of the form ‘A = A’, or 
∀ x (f (x) → f (x)), but (2) is not at all an ordinary English sentence. Figures 
of speech apart (e.g. ‘War is war’), we have no use for such a reduplication 
of predicates; it is vacuous or, in the terminology of the Tractatus, senseless 
[sinnlos]. Saying that a predicate applies to things to which it applies is 
comparable to lifting up a chess piece and emphatically putting it down again 
on the same square. That is not a move in the game, and similarly, one could 
well imagine that in our natural language we might shrug off sentences such 
as (2) as ungrammatical. Just as we teach our children that a grammatical 
sentence must have subject and predicate, we might well make it another 
learners’ grammar rule that subject and predicate must be different (cf.: ‘a 
chess piece must be moved to another square’). Expressions of the form ‘A = 
A’ may of course be used in poetry (‘A rose is a rose is a rose’) or for rhetorical 
effects, but just like ‘Bachelors, oh, bachelors!’ they don’t count as declarative 
sentences, so the question of truth or falsity doesn’t arise.
To be sure, we don’t as a matter of fact dismiss sentences such as (2) 
as ungrammatical, but the fact remains that we don’t use them, because, in 
a natural sense of the word, they don’t say anything: they are empty and 
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pointless. It is a psychological matter that when forced to call them either 
‘true’ or ‘false’, we find it more natural to call them ‘true’, but as far as the 
actual workings of our language are concerned, we might just as well call them 
‘nonsense’ (cf. PI §252). Hence, for Quine to explain the truth or correctness 
of an ordinary analytic sentence such as (1) as based on the alleged truth of 
such a linguistic anomaly as (2) is rather perverse.
A much more natural and plausible explanation of the truth of
(1) A bachelor is an unmarried man.
is to say that it is based on, and an expression of, a semantic norm or conven-
tion, namely (Def): that the word ‘bachelor’ is correctly applied to unmarried 
men (and nothing else).
It is not an effective objection to the more natural view of analyticity (as 
due to semantic norms, or the meanings of the words involved) to protest that 
the existence of such linguistic norms is a contingent matter, whereas analytic 
truths are supposed to be necessary. This objection rests on a confusion of 
the internal and the external perspective on a rule-governed activity (cf. Hart 
1961, 86–7). The rules of chess, for example, are regarded from an internal 
point of view as fixed and non-negotiable when one is playing chess. That 
in a certain game the bishop moved from c1 to f4 is a contingent matter; 
a different move with the bishop or another piece might have been made 
instead. But that the bishop was not moved from c1 to c2 is not a contingent 
matter, for such a move is illegal. Within chess it is a necessary truth that 
bishops can move only diagonally, for such are the rules of the game. Again, 
in a certain position a mate in three moves can be forced. Chess problems 
are based on the necessity that is produced by the rules treated as fixed and 
unchangeable: In response to White’s move, Black must move and he can only 
move in such and such a way. That is a necessary truth in chess, obviously 
due to nothing but the rules, which from the internal point of view of chess 
players are absolutely binding. And yet, of course, there is also an external 
point of view from which one can describe the origin and development of 
the game. Here, from a historical or sociological point of view, the same rules 
are just contingent conventions, which have changed in the past and may 
change again, should we at some point decide to play a different version of 
the game of chess instead. Similarly, we can adopt an external perspective on 
linguistic meanings: considering their origins and changes over time. But that 
in no way detracts from their normative force when, taking up an internal 
perspective, we accept and apply them as they are. While a game is being 
played and the rules accepted, those rules create necessity, i.e. the must and 
must not of valid norms.1
Having missed the most plausible construal of analytic truths, Quine 
suggests that ‘truth by convention’ cannot be due to definitions, as they are 
only conventions of notational abbreviation (Quine 1936, 322), available to 
1 For a more detailed discussion of analyticity, see Schroeder 2009.
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transform truths, but not to found them. Rather, we must look for another 
sort of convention, namely postulates (331), ‘assigning truth’ to a certain kind 
of statement (334). He then proceeds to set up logic axiomatically, presenting 
three postulates or axioms that suffice for developing the propositional 
calculus (one of them corresponding to the inference rule of modus ponens: 
licensing the assignment of truth to any ‘q’ given the truth of ‘p → q’ and ‘p’), 
and hinting at four more to cover the predicate calculus as well. Finally, he 
presents the following problem:
Each of these conventions is general, announcing the truth of every 
one of an infinity of statements conforming to a certain description; 
derivation of the truth of any specific statement from the general 
convention thus requires a logical inference, and this involves us in an 
infinite regress. [Quine 1936, 342]
In a word, the difficulty is that if logic is to proceed mediately from 
conventions, logic is needed for inferring logic from the conventions. 
Alternatively, the difficulty which appears thus as a self-presupposition 
of doctrine can be framed as turning upon a self-presupposition of 
primitives. It is supposed that the if-idiom, the not-idiom, and so on, 
mean nothing to us initially, and that we adopt the conventions (I)-
(VII) by way of circumscribing their meaning; and the difficulty is that 
communication of (I)–(VII) themselves depends upon free use of those 
very idioms which we are attempting to circumscribe, and can succeed 
only if we are already conversant with the idioms. [Quine 1936, 343]
If instead of an axiomatic system we use truth tables to present the 
propositional calculus (as Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus), we can explain 
the if-idiom by the following diagram:
p q p → q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
The diagram is to be taken to mean that if ‘p’ is true and ‘q’ is true then 
‘p → q’ is true, if ‘p’ is true and ‘q’ is false then ‘p → q’ is false, etc. Thus, 
in explaining the if-idiom, symbolised by the arrow, we already use the if-
idiom. That is the infinite regress, or circularity, Quine is concerned about: 
we cannot explain, and thus set up, logic (logical concepts) without already 
using logic (logical concepts). One could also put it, more generally, like this: 
Every use of language involves logic, yet one cannot explain logic without 
language. In short, one cannot explain logic (or language) without already 
using logic (or language).
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The point is a familiar one: one cannot learn one’s mother tongue with 
dictionary and grammar book: through definitions and lists of grammatical 
rules. Children acquire their first language by imitation and practice, instead. 
And they are certainly not told during the first stages of learning that the 
sounds and meanings of our words are conventional. They learn that the 
colour of grass is called ‘green’ long before realizing that there are different 
names for it in other languages and that it could have been different in 
ours. Does that mean that linguistic meaning and grammar are not in fact 
conventional? Certainly not.
Towards the end of his article Quine comes close to acknowledging as 
much, considering that ‘it may be held that we can adopt conventions through 
behaviour, without first announcing them in words; and that we can return 
and formulate our conventions verbally afterwards, if we choose, when a full 
language is at our disposal’ (Quine 1936, 344). And although he concedes 
that ‘this account accords well with what we actually do’ (344), in the end it 
seems to him too vague and insubstantial:
We may wonder what one adds to the bare statement that the truths 
of logic and mathematics are a priori, or to the still barer behavioristic 
statement that they are firmly accepted, when he characterizes them as 
true by convention in such a sense. [Quine 1936, 344–5]
These questions are not so difficult to answer. That logic and mathematics 
are a priori means that we can verify their statements without recourse to 
experience. That is an epistemological observation in need of explanation: 
How can there be statements—apparently assertions about the way things 
are—whose truth does not depend on the way things are found to be in the 
world? A plausible explanation of the apriority of logical and mathematical 
propositions is that their truth is due solely to the conventional meanings of 
the words or symbols involved (rather than, say, to some alleged faculty of 
intuition). To the extent to which we are familiar with their meanings, then, 
we have no need for further experience in order to convince ourselves of the 
truth of such propositions.
It is certainly true that an account needs to be given of what it means to 
say that something is conventional when it was never explicitly introduced 
as such. The criterion for something being a convention is certainly not (as 
Quine suggests) that it is ‘firmly accepted’: Numerous empirical truths have 
been firmly accepted, without thereby becoming mere conventions, while 
on the other hand, the acceptance of a convention can be more or less firm: 
even while a convention is still in force people may be half-hearted about it, 
regularly considering alternatives.
In order to clarify the concept, consider as a clear example of a 
convention the use of the English word ‘blue’ (cf. Hart 1961, 54–6; Schroeder 
1998, 41–50):
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(i) There is far-reaching agreement among our linguistic community 
about the correct spelling, pronunciation, and application of this word.
(ii) Spelling, pronunciation and use of the word are, however, in a certain 
sense, arbitrary, i.e. not forced upon us by the facts of nature. A different 
sign with a different pronunciation would be just as serviceable, as illustrated 
by the equivalent words in other languages. What is more, we are not even 
compelled by nature to have a word with exactly that meaning. As is well 
known, the boundaries between different colours are conventional too, 
drawn differently in different languages. In Russian, for example, there is no 
equivalent for the English ‘blue’, but one word for ‘dark blue’ [синий] and 
another for ‘light blue’ [голубой].
(iii) The standard spelling, pronunciation and use of the word are 
consistently kept and conveyed to new members of the community. Deviations 
are corrected and those corrections are normally accepted. Significantly, such 
corrections are based only on the fact that a certain linguistic norm is actually 
in force; it is not required for an appropriate correction of a deviation that 
the norm in question be intrinsically justified. Thus, to be entitled to correct 
someone’s spelling, pronunciation or use of the word ‘blue’ you only need to 
point out that it is not in agreement with common usage; you do not need 
to argue that it is a good thing for that English word to be spelt, pronounced 
or applied as it is. That is a crucial feature of the conventionality of a rule 
(as opposed to its functionality, for instance): the standard of correctness is 
constituted by social agreement, and therefore criticisms of deviation need to 
refer only to that social agreement or acceptance, regardless of whether what 
is thus socially accepted is intrinsically reasonable or better than possible 
alternatives.
If, according to those three criteria, linguistic meaning is conventional, 
so is logic. For logic is just an abstraction from linguistic meaning where 
it concerns the relations between the truth or falsity of sentences. In a 
broad sense of the term ‘logic’, it follows logically from the statement that 
Jones is a bachelor that Jones is unmarried. Taken in that broad sense, all 
word meanings are relevant to logic. In a narrower sense of the term, logic 
is concerned with relations between the truth or falsity of statements that 
depend only on certain structural words, such as ‘not’, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if ’, or ‘all’, 
together obviously with the terms used to explain the logical features of 
such connectives, namely: ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘proposition’, ‘implies’ etc. Either way, 
insofar as word meaning is conventional, so is logic, which merely reflects 
certain semantic aspects of our language. Using words with certain meanings 
ipso facto involves using logic. For any substantive change in inferences we 
draw and accept is a change in meaning. (For example, if ‘p v q’ is taken to 
imply ‘p’, then ‘v’ cannot mean the same as our ‘or’.)
One may object that since what is conventional could be otherwise, logic 
cannot be conventional: for after all, one cannot think illogically. — The first 
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reply is that, of course, logic could be otherwise. It is a matter of logic that ‘p 
& q’ implies ‘p’; but we could easily introduce a rule forbidding this inference. 
Obviously, such a rule would change the meaning of ‘p & q’. ‘Logical’ means: 
in accordance with meaning. That one cannot think illogically—that one 
cannot go against meaning (on pain of producing nonsense), doesn’t show 
that meanings cannot change, and with them our logical inferences. — 
Against this one may want to say that, of course, words could have different 
meanings; but given their current meanings, their implications couldn’t be 
different. That, it would appear, is ‘the hardness of the logical must’ (PI §437), 
much firmer than mere convention! — However, the implications just are an 
integral part of the meanings. So what the revised objection boils down to is 
this: Holding on to the words’ current meanings, their meanings couldn’t be 
different. And that’s not saying anything.
(ii) Dummett’s objection that conventionalism cannot explain logical
    inferences
Michael Dummett, in his influential review of the first edition of Wittgenstein’s 
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, presents another, though re-
lated, criticism2 of the logical positivist account of mathematics. ‘Modified 
conventionalism’ is Dummett’s label for the logical positivist view that only 
some necessary truths are ‘straightforwardly registers of conventions we 
have laid down; others are more or less remote consequences of conventions’ 
(Dummett 1959, 494). Dummett objects:
This account is entirely superficial and throws away all the advantages
of conventionalism, since it leaves unexplained the status of the asser-
tion that certain conventions have certain consequences. [Dummett
1959, 494]
More recently, Dummett’s objection has been urged by Michael Wrigley:
The more usual form of conventionalism, associated with Logical 
Positivism, held that certain basic necessary truths owed their necessity 
purely to our having an explicit convention to that effect, and that all 
other necessary truths were consequences of these basic conventions. 
This theory of necessity is immediately attractive because it removes 
the epistemological mystery from necessary truth. Its crucial flaw, 
however, is its inability to explain this notion of consequence. The 
fact that such-and-such basic conventions have such-and-such conse-
quences is a necessary truth but it cannot be a basic convention. What 
then is the source of its necessity? [Wrigley 1980, 349–50]
2 Perhaps Dummett’s criticism was inspired by Quine’s remark, quoted above, that: ‘logic is 
needed for inferring logic from the conventions’.
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However, it is difficult to see the force of this objection. The picture 
seems to be something like this: We stipulate a set of axioms, say, the nine 
axioms of Frege’s Begriffsschrift:
1. ├ A → (B → A)
2. ├ [A → (B → C)] → [(A → B) → (A →C)]
3. ├ [D → (B → A)] → [B → (D → A)]
4. ├ (B → A) → (~A → ~B)
5. ├ ~~A → A
6. ├ A → ~~A
7. ├ (c = d) → (f (c) → f (d))
8. ├ c = c
9. ├ ∀a f (a) → f (c)
How then do we get from those axioms to any other logical truth, not among 
them, for instance:
(c1) ∀x(f (x) → g (x)) → (g (a) v ~f (a))
Presumably, (c1) is a consequence of the axioms, but how it follows from 
them hasn’t been explained.
Something like that would appear to be the picture behind Dummett’s 
complaint—but it can be quickly dismissed by simply completing the account 
of Frege’s calculus. For those nine axioms are not the only conventions in 
Begriffsschrift. There are also three derivation rules (viz. Generalisation, 
Modus ponens, and a substitution rule), which provide a formal explanation 
of what in this calculus is to count as a ‘consequence’ of a given formula, and 
by means of which it is very easy to derive (c1).
That is the obvious answer to Dummett’s criticism: Conventions need not 
take the form of axiomatic statements, they can also be procedural rules, in 
particular: inference rules, to make explicit the idea of a logical consequence 
(cf. Bennett 1961). Hence, in the case of an axiomatic system, the idea that a 
conventionalist, such as Ayer, would lack the resources ‘to explain the notion 
of consequence’ is quite groundless.
What about necessary truth in natural languages? As explained above, 
logical and analytic truths are due to the meanings of words. For example, 
it characterises the meaning of the word ‘if ’ that a statement of the form ‘p, 
and if p then q’ implies ‘q’. If we did not acknowledge this consequence we 
would ipso facto have given a different meaning to the word ‘if ’. To the extent 
to which the meanings of words have been fixed, the logical consequences of 
statements made up of those words have been fixed too. Any unclarity about 
the logical implications of a statement is an unclarity about the statement’s 
meaning. So on closer inspection, Dummett’s worry is just inconsistent. 
The idea that we might understand a set of explicit linguistic conventions 
(and hence the vocabulary from which those conventions are formulated 
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and which they partly explain), without yet understanding, or being able to 
work out, how other things follow from those conventions (and are thus also 
conventionally determined), doesn’t make any sense.
In a word, Dummett’s mistake is to think of logic as something on top 
of meaning.3 The philosophical picture here is that you can understand 
the meanings of all the words and statements—and yet not know what 
logical relations obtain between those statements. Then of course those 
logical relations, as something separate from meaning, begin to look rather 
mysteriously ‘unexplained’. It is indeed hard to understand what could be the 
source of such a free-floating, ethereal mechanism of necessity.
(iii) Crispin Wright’s infinite regress objection
Something like, or broadly in agreement with, our response to Quine and 
Dummett in the preceding sections was already proposed by Jonathan 
Bennett (1961), trying to show how conventionalism can also explain the 
notion of logical consequence. Crispin Wright, however, discusses and rejects 
this reply as unsatisfactory, claiming that it falls foul of an infinite regress, 
which can be presented as follows:
(1) On the view under discussion (‘modified conventionalism’), all 
necessary truths are either conventions or their implications.
(2) Suppose a set of conventions C implies a statement Q.
(3) Now, what is the status of this second-order statement [i] ‘C implies 
Q’?
(4) Expressing a conceptual truth, (i) must be a necessary truth too.
(5) Hence, according to the view under discussion, it must be either an 
explicit convention or an implication of conventions.
(6) As it’s not an explicit convention, it must be an implication of 
conventions.
(7) But the only conventions on which the truth of (i) depends are the 
set C.4
(8) Hence, [ii] ‘C implies “C implies Q”’.
(9) But (ii) must be a necessary truth, too.
(10) And not being a convention itself, (ii) must be the implication of 
conventions.
(11) And again, the only relevant conventions are the set C.
(12) Hence, [iii] ‘C implies “C implies ‘C implies Q”’’.
And so on, ad infinitum (Wright 1980, 347–50).
3 The same mistake was committed more recently by T. Williamson (2006, 13–14).
4 Let us assume that C also contains conventions governing the use of the word ‘imply’.
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Wright then argues that this infinite regress provides a fatal objection to the 
standard (‘modified’) conventionalist view:
The model thus appears to require that in order to recognise the 
status of any consequence of initial logical consequence conventions, 
we have to recognise the same of infinitely many statements. [Wright 
1980, 351]
In other words: Wright claims that, according to ‘modified conven tionalism’, 
in order to understand that Q is implied by a set of conventions C, we’d have 
to understand first that ‘Q is implied by C’ is itself implied by C. And in 
order to understand that, we’d have to understand first that ‘“Q is implied by 
C” is implied by C’ is implied by C, and so on and so forth. Hence, in order 
to understand any inference from a given set of conventions, we’d have to 
understand an infinity of inferences—which is impossible.
However, that conclusion does not follow. The infinite regress line (1–12) 
shows how a derived necessary statement allows the construction of a higher-
order necessary statement, for which in turn we can construct a higher-order 
necessary statement, and so on and so forth. But that does not mean that we 
have to embark on this endless series of constructions. Indeed, it’s not even 
clear that in order to be aware of a given statement’s derived necessity we 
have to be aware of the possibility of endlessly constructing meta-statements 
in this way.
Consider the following analogous argument:
Suppose S is an English sentence. In order to understand the linguistic 
meaning of S we have to recognise that:
  (i) S is an English sentence.
But (i) is itself an English sentence. In order to understand the linguistic 
meaning of (i) we have to recognise that:
  (ii) (i) is an English sentence.
And so on indefinitely.
However, in order to understand that S—say ‘It’s raining’—is an English 
sentence, you don’t have to recognise that ‘“It’s raining” is an English sentence’ 
is itself an English sentence. There is no need to consider that sentence at all. 
After all, your understanding of ‘It’s raining’ need not even be formulated in 
a sentence.
Or again: if a statement S is true, then ‘S is true’ is itself true. And so 
is: “‘S is true” is true’, and so forth. You can consider, and convince yourself 
of, the endless possibility of iterating the truth predicate; but you don’t have 
to. You can simply convince yourself that a given statement—‘It’s raining’—
is true (say, by looking out of the window), without considering any such 
possible iterations.
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Like the ‘truth’-predicate, the predicate ‘is analytic’ can always be applied 
to result of its applications (provided the initial sentence is quoted and not 
just referred to by a label or an incidental description). ‘“A bachelor is an 
unmarried man” is analytic’ is itself analytic. Again, we can continue the 
series, but we don’t have to.
Similarly, if we present analytic truths as consequences of a set of all 
semantic conventions (as in Wright’s argument), we can easily convince 
ourselves that this set entails not only a given analytic truth, but also that 
statement of entailment itself, and so on and so forth. But so what? It does 
not follow, as Wright seems to think, that, on the moderate conventionalist 
view, understanding the initial statement (say, that S is analytic) would require 
that we run through the whole series of iterations: accomplishing ‘infinitely 
many such feats of recognition’ (Wright 1980, 351). Indeed, we need not even 
consider the possibility of such endless iterations.
To recapitulate: None of the objections to (moderate) conventionalism 
considered so far are convincing. Quine is concerned that explicit statements 
of linguistic conventions presuppose the use of linguistic conventions, but 
he half admits himself that conventions need not originate with explicit 
formulations. Dummett complains that moderate conventionalism leaves 
unexplained how certain conventions can have certain consequences, but 
with respect to formal systems that is patently mistaken since the concept 
of a logical consequence is explained by conventional rules of inference, and 
with respect to ordinary language it is inconsistent since the understanding 
of logical implication is simply an aspect of the understanding of linguistic 
meaning: you cannot have the latter without the former. Finally, Wright 
argues that statements of logical inference imply an infinite series of meta-
statements which, per impossibile, one would have to recognise in order to 
understand the initial inference, but, as explained, that is a non sequitur: the 
possibility of endlessly constructing such meta-statements does not establish 
the necessity to do so.
(iv) The objection to ‘moderate conventionalism’ from scepticism about
    rule-following
However, Dummett and Wright believe that there is yet another, more 
radical and devastating objection to moderate conventionalism, namely 
Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. On their reading (largely in 
agreement with Saul Kripke’s (1982)), Wittgenstein has presented a sceptical 
problem with the very notion of conventional semantic rules. On this view, 
Wittgenstein argues that it is never ‘determined in advance’ whether a certain 
concept applies in a given case, or what is to be the result of a calculation 
(Wright 1980, 22). That means (according to this reading of Wittgenstein) 
that it is never determined in advance what is to count as a consequence of 
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a given set of conventions. Therefore, they argue, Wittgenstein could not 
accept ‘moderate conventionalism’, but had to go for ‘full-blooded’ or ‘radical 
conventionalism’, the view that:
the logical necessity of any statement is always the direct expression of 
a linguistic convention. That a given statement is necessary consists 
always in our having expressly decided to treat that very statement 
as unassailable; it cannot rest on our having adopted certain other 
conventions which are found to involve our treating it so. This account 
is applied alike to deep theorems and to elementary computations. 
[Dummett 1959, 495]
Thus for every new calculation or inference, ‘we are free to choose to accept 
or reject’ it (Dummett 1959, 495), provided we all agree on our choice: For 
right is simply what the community accepts (Wright 1980, 226).
As a response to Wittgenstein’s rule-following problem the community 
view is a complete failure. For if it cannot be fixed in advance what in a given 
case is a correct application of the concept ‘+ 2’, then it is equally impossible 
to fix in advance what in a given case is to count as ‘community agreement’ 
(RFM 392c). Both are on exactly the same footing as instances of Wittgenstein’s 
problem: How can a general concept determine its particular applications?
For another thing, in an account of mathematics, the distinction 
between conventions and their implications (‘moderate conventionalism’), 
far from being a weakness or an embarrassment, is definitely what we want 
(cf. RFM 228f; PR 248g). For the alternative, the view that all mathematical 
propositions are conventions is evidently empirically false: in conflict with the 
facts of mathematical practice. As noted above, the mark of conventionality is 
that the standard of correctness is constituted by social agreement, and that 
therefore criticisms of deviation need to refer only to that social agreement 
or acceptance. That is true of basic definitions in arithmetic. How can you 
justify your insistence that the successor natural number after 6 is 7? Well, 
that is simply what has been conventionally agreed: what you’ve been told by 
teachers and what you find in all the books. But things are very different with 
the claim that 7,957  23,249 = 184,992,293. The reason I can give for insisting 
on this equation is not that this just is what everybody accepts—I haven’t 
encountered any acceptance of this sum yet, neither by teachers, nor in books, 
nor by anybody else; rather, my reason for accepting it is that (I convinced 
myself that) it is what one gets if one carries out a certain kind of procedure 
for long multiplications. (And note that, pace Wittgenstein’s metaphor (RFM 
165), taken up by Dummett (1959, 496), there is as a matter of fact no ‘putting 
in the archives’ of such new sums either: my accepting that sum now will not 
be invoked by future mathematicians in order to justify their acceptance of 
it afterwards. They will never know of my calculations, and even if they did, 
the fact that I believe this to be the right result will carry no normative force 
against the standard procedural criteria.) Empirically speaking, there is no 
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social agreement on this particular sum, there is social agreement only on 
the general principles of multiplication. Hence it is not the particular sum 
that is treated as a convention, but the rules of multiplication. ‘Full-blooded 
conventionalism’, refusing to acknowledge the distinction between definitions 
and calculations, just doesn’t agree with our mathematical practice.
Moreover, the idea of ‘full-blooded conventionalism’ is not only ‘hard to 
swallow’ (as Dummett complains), and empirically false, but sheer nonsense. 
Dummett seems to think, like Quine, that conventionality might simply be a 
matter of firm acceptance of a given statement, treating it as ‘unassailable’, so 
that if we decided to hold a given statement as true come what may we would 
thereby turn it into a convention. Not so.
To begin with, a particular statement is not a convention, however 
stubbornly one may hold on to its truth. A convention is an agreement what 
to do (not just what to believe) under certain repeatable circumstances, in a 
certain kind of situation, not just on one occasion. Hence a referendum, a 
one-off decision, is not a convention. Thus we have conventions about how 
to calculate sums, any sums, i.e. conventions about the use of the addition 
sign, the multiplication sign, etc. Of course it is conceivable that instead of 
having the whole system of elementary arithmetic we might only use a few 
individual formulae, such as ‘5 + 7 = 12’. In other words, the use of the sign 
‘+’ might be limited to only a few combinations of numbers. The reason why 
even in isolation such a single sum could be a convention is that it is general 
in its application: it is to be used again and again for calculation the overall 
number of five objects together with seven other objects.
And here already the rule-following considerations come in: For there 
is a jump from the general formula to its application on a given occasion. 
(How do I know that ‘7’ doesn’t mean ‘8’ on a Sunday? How do I know that 
wooden objects are to be counted in the same way as metal objects?) Indeed 
even the mere reproduction of the same formula is a case of rule-following: 
Having agreed to the equation now does not force me to agree to it tomorrow. 
(Having agreed to ‘Today is Sunday’ today, I shall reject it tomorrow.) In 
other words, coming up with a new token of the formula tomorrow because 
we agreed to one today, is also an inference (cf. PI §214).
Generality is essential to the very concept of a convention. Any convention 
requires applications to countless particular cases, i.e. inferences to what to 
do on a particular occasion. Deciding from case to case, as envisaged by 
Dummett, simply means not having conventions. Hence Dummett’s idea of 
conventionality without any inferences is a contradiction in terms.
It is important to note how wide the scope of Wittgenstein’s rule-
following considerations is. If, like Dummett, Kripke, and Wright, we took 
them to show that there could be no rule-governed inferences from the 
general to the particular, we would have to give up on conventions, most 
notably on linguistic conventions, and hence on general terms in any kind of 
statement or utterance. On that reading of the rule-following considerations, 
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there could be no concepts with an intension determining their extension. 
There could simply be no language!
Wittgenstein’s famous rule-following argument (of PI §§198–201) is a 
reductio ad absurdum: If you insist on a certain philosophical account of rule-
following, rule-following (and hence language) turns out be impossible. So, 
clearly, that philosophical account of rule-following must be mistaken—‘it 
can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here’ (PI §201).5 — Obviously, 
for such an argument to be understood, the absurdity that is presented as 
a provisional conclusion must be recognized as such. It is crucial that one 
sees just how devastating the implications of the view in question are—
which is what Dummett and Wright failed to do. Dummett thought that it 
would undermine just a moderate type of conventionalism, whereas in fact 
it would do away with conventions, language and all. Wright, like Kripke, 
thought the damage could be patched up by invoking community agreement, 
not realising that the recognition of community agreement would itself have 
become impossible.
The philosophical prejudice that is shown by Wittgenstein to lead to 
absurdity is the view that for it to be determined that a concept F applies on 
a particular occasion o it must be unmistakably and compellingly laid down 
somewhere that F applies on o, and so for every possible application. We 
are particularly inclined to think that for meaning to be fixed in advance of 
particular applications, there must be something in our heads from which 
any particular application could be derived with logical necessity.6 In the 
first sections of Part 1 of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 
Wittgenstein makes it very clear that, of course, meaning is determined; only 
that determination must not be imagined to consist in some sort of infinitely 
explicit instruction manual in our heads. Meaning is use, and cannot be 
reduced to, or be based on, mental representation. In short, Wittgenstein’s 
verdict that meaning is not determined by mental representation in the head 
(see e.g. RFM 409c), is turned by Dummett, Kripke, and Wright into the 
absurdly radical claim that meaning is not determined full stop (e.g. Wright 
1980, 22), we can never be committed by any semantic convention (232), 
meanings are always to be freely chosen by us as we go along (Dummett 
1959, 495–6).7 It would appear that Dummett, Kripke, and Wright belong 
to the generation of analytical philosophers of whom Bede Rundle remarked 
that they no longer have a nose for nonsense; and of the latter two one can 
even say that they appear to have a taste for it (Rundle 1997, ix–x).
5 For a more detailed account of the dialectic of Wittgenstein’s rule-following discussion, 
see Schroeder 2006, 185–201.
6 Wittgenstein also considers ostensive definitions (PI §§27–64) and Platonist ideas of a 
foundation of meaning (PI §§191–7), but most people today, like Kripke and Wright, 
seem to find the mentalistic line far more tempting.
7 Wittgenstein says exactly the opposite: ‘When I follow a rule, I do not choose’ (PI §219).
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In conclusion, Quine’s, Dummett’s, and Wright’s objections to conventionalism 
are unsuccessful, and the rule-following considerations do not provide any 
convincing objection to ‘moderate conventionalism’ (i.e., the only consistent 
form of conventionalism) either. It is an egregious misunderstanding to think 
that Wittgenstein tried to argue against the possibility of inferences from 
general statements to particular cases. And if his remarks were, perversely, 
interpreted in such a destructive way they would gainsay not only ‘moderate 
conventionalism’, but the very possibility of general concepts, that is, of 
language.8
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